Of course, there are many flavours of offending speech. Bromwich cites those lines without recognizing that . Mill (an eminently privileged English philosopher and member of Parliament) never had to think very deeply or sympathetically about the experience of, say, hate speech; he was approaching these philosophical problems from the perspective of someone who already had his hands on the levers of cultural power. Mill is surely right to observe that the cry of “I’m offended” often operates as a political bludgeon with which to silence an opponent. But the more interesting and challenging questions involve the actual uses of that bludgeon. Some political actors have used their moral indignation to effect positive social change—and their desire to chill certain kinds of speech is perfectly compatible with (or necessary to achieve) a more just society. At other times, groups may use their veto for the most craven political purposes. (The triggering of the offence mechanism in order to shut down debate, say, or to elicit the resignation of a high-profile academic—who is surely entitled to argue a point of view in a national magazine, and even to retract parts of it later.) In either case, the actual uses of that veto are never morally neutral.